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Justification for Future TACKLE Missions

1. The COMOR has evaluated the four TACKLE missions accomplished to date over Communist China. Each of these missions, to a varying degree, has provided significant intelligence information on a number of critical intelligence collection requirements listed in the Priority National Intelligence Objectives (PNIOs),

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2. In conducting its evaluation, the COMOR has made a comparison of the information available prior to TACKLE missions with the information since obtained by TACKLE on particular targets. This detailed comparison is set forth in the following annexes:

Annex

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3. A summary of the gains from TACKLE and the priority objectives still to be covered or requiring specific re-coverage by TACKLE is presented as Annex A. A recommendation

is contained in paragraph 12 of this memorandum.

4. COMOR considered a variety of other factors in its general review of the need for continuing the TACKLE program.

Broadly these break down into four categories:

- a. The importance of Communist China as an intelligence target;
- b. The limited ability of other non-TACKLE sources to collect the information required;
- c. The need for high resolution coverage of critical targets;
- d. The comparative value of TACKLE versus KEYHOLE.

5. NIE 13-4-62, NIE 13-2-62 and the most recent Priority National Intelligence Objective (PNIO) list shed light on the question of the importance of the ChiCom as an intelligence target and the all-source ability to collect intelligence.

6. It is apparent from a review of the conclusions of NIE 13-4-62, "Prospects for Communist China" that the immediate future is a critical period for the determination of the future course of Communist China. NIE 13-2-62, "Chinese Communist Advanced Weapons Capabilities" is an attempt to gauge the threat

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in more precise terms and states in the Foreword / that: "The evidence available to us clearly proves the existence of programs

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for various comparable Soviet programs." The extent to which Communist China will be a powerful factor affecting U. S. policy and the situation in the Far East during the next few years will be strongly influenced by Communist China's ability to:

- a. Recover from the effects of the serious economic difficulties brought about by mismanagement, natural disaster, and the probable withdrawal of Soviet aid;
- b. Develop a domestic nuclear energy program and produce an advanced weapons system in the face of its economic hardships; and
- c. Continue to develop and expand its conventional military power.

7. The PNIO list gives further emphasis to the community need for priority intelligence on China. The following are pertinent to major problems on which TACKLE can provide highly significant or very useful information:

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